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THE ADVOCACY HORIZON245.1EPAs Will Be Costly245.2EPAs Will Not Promote Regional Integration and Trade255.3Deadlines Are Unrealistic265.4Aid for trade: blackmailing ACP countries into the EPAs, without offering new support 265.5The Waiver Issue: A Non Issue275.6There Is Alternative to EPAs276PARTING WORDS28 LIST OF ACRONYMS ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific [countries] AU The African Union CAP Common Agriculture Policy CEDAW Convention for the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CPA Cotonou Partnership Agreement CSO Civil Society Organization EAC East African Community EACU East African Customs Union EBA Everything But Arms EC The European Commission ECDMP European Centre for Development and Management Policy ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECU European Currency Unit EDF European Development Fund EEC European Economic Community EIB European Investment Bank EPA(s) Economic Partnership Agreement (s) ESA Eastern and Southern Africa EU The European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Agreement GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariff and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GSP Generalized System of Preferences JPA Joint Parliamentary Assembly KRA Kenya Revenue Authority LATF Local Authorities Transfer Fund LDC Least Developed Country LLIC Landlocked and Island Country MSE(s) Micro and Small Enterprise(s) REPA Regional Economic Partnership Agreement RTA Regional Trade Area SADC Southern African Development Community SDT/S&D Special and Differentail Treatment SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards [Measures] STABEX Export Stabilization Facility SYSMIN System Minerais TWN Third World Network UN United Nations UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa VAT Value Added Tax WTO World Trade Organization 1. AFRICA-EUROPEAN RELATIONS A HISTORY OF EXPLOITATIVE RELATIONS Eduardo Galeano, a Peruvian journalist, in his seminal book, Open Veins of Latin America, avers that the division of labour among nations is that some specialize in winning and others in losing. (Galeano 173:11) Africa has, since the famed trip round the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese, specialized in losing. The relationship between the countries of Africa and those of Europe may be appreciated by looking at cultures of both Africa and Europe and trade between them before the 15th century. The cultures were comparable, albeit different while trade was conducted on equal footing. With the conquering of the seas by the European naval ships, the nature of relations between the two continents indeed between Europe and the rest of the world changed fundamentally. Europeans used the superiority of their ships and cannon to gain the world waterways. While before, the trade had been on African gold, superior leather products (then known as Moroccan leather), bark cloth, cotton cloth, kola nuts and dried fish, among other products from Africa, with the European conquest came trade in human merchandise slave trade. Many guilty consciences have been created by the slave trade. Europeans and Africans alike are culpable. Europeans carried out the trade. But it would have not been possible without active participation of certain Africans. To appease their conscience, many Europeans try to throw the major responsibility of this abominable trade on the Africans as if without European demand for slaves Africans in their millions would have just snaked their way from the hinterlands to the beaches! The fact is that the trade in slaves, like the present trade between Africa and Europe, was a response to external factors. The European slave trade was direct impediment to technological development. First, it depopulated Africa (see Table 1 below). Secondly, it targeted youth and young adults, who are usually the motive force behind any innovation. The ones that remained were more pre-occupied with avoiding slave captors than with working on improvement of their productive capacities. Table 1: Estimates of world population (in millions) according to continents 1650175018501900Africa100100100120Europe103144274423Asia257437656857Source: Rodney 1972 When slave trade became untenable and had to be abolished, a new framework for the exploitation of African resources replaced it direct extraction of natural resources and physical presence of the European presence in Africa through colonial governments. The import/export relationship between Africa and Europe has been one of unequal exchange and of exploitation. Even more far-reaching than just trade is the actual ownership of means of production of one country by citizens of another. When citizens of Europe own land and the mines of Africa, this is the most direct way of externalization of the latters resources. Under colonialism, the ownership was complete and backed by military and police forces. Today in African countries the foreign ownership is still present and growing with the lure of the much-heralded foreign direct investment (FDI) craze, even though the flags and armies of foreign powers were removed almost a quarter century ago. So long as the foreigners own land, mines, banks, factories, insurance companies, power stations, newspapers, means of transport, supermarkets etc. then for long will Africas wealth continue to flow into the hands of such elements. This is the situation that obtains and, as we shall see, it is the situation Economic Partnership Agreements between the countries of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) on the one side and those of the European Union (EU) on the other seek to perpetuate. 2. FROM LOME TO COTONOU 2.1 History and Evolution Formal cooperation between ACP and the EU countries can be traced back to 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed to create the European Economic Community (EEC). In it communing parties expressed solidarity with colonies and overseas countries and territories and made a commitment to contribute to their prosperity. A) Yaound I-II Even before the signing of the First Lome Convention in 1975, such arrangements as the liberalized trade to be developed with former European colonies under Part IV the Treaty of Rome (that established the nucleus for the present EU) were in place. Procedures for continuing old colonial economic relations were annexed to the Treaty as an implementing Convention. With the establishment, in 1958, of the European Development Fund (EDF) with 581 million Units of Account (forerunner to ECU) to spend as grants for economic and social infrastructure projects in the colonies, a stage had been set for an unequal partnership between Europe and countries of Africa. No sooner was the EDF set than Senegals groundnuts began experiencing low prices in France. With active persuasion of France, Senegal benefited from the EDF. This was followed by a few other (mainly French) colonies. The first association between ACP and EEC states was signed in Yaound, Cameroon, in July 1963, hence its name, the Yaound Convention. The first convention (Yaound I ) ran from 1963 to 1969. Yaound II was in effect between 1970 and 1975. Yaound conventions targeted Francophone African countries almost exclusively, with the provision of infrastructure being the main focus. B) Lome I-II Nigeria was the first non-French speaking African country to sign co-operation agreement with EEC in 1966, but which it did not ratify for political reasons. In 1969 the East African Community - grouping Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - signed with the EEC and agreement called the Arusha Agreement. In 1973, the United Kingdom became a member of the EEC. This led to the need to have her former colonies included in the EEC cooperation agreement. As her colonial tentacles had been spread beyond Africa into the Caribbean and Pacific islands, the new cooperation had to include these regions. With the Second Yaounde Convention, renewed in 1970, due to expire on January 31, 1975, countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) began to negotiate for a more comprehensive agreement. The ACP group had been created by the Georgetown Agreement. There were a number of motivating factors for the formation of the ACP group. Chief among them was the sharing a number of common interests, like sugar, with principal factor being that the Caribbean and Pacific contingents wanted to take advantage of Africas bargaining power, which was then considerable. The African Members of the ACP announced their negotiating principles at an OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1973. The principles were: That the EEC should not expect reciprocal tariff concessions from Africa for whatever concessions they made; That any rights of establishment granted to Europe should be available to other countries as well (this was in response to pressure exerted by the USA and Japan); That the rules of origin in the Yaound Conventions should be reviewed; That the rules of the Yaound Conventions relating to capital movements should also be reviewed; That Africa should have free access to EEC financial and technical assistance; That there should be free access to foreign goods to the EEC market whether or not they were covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); That stable, equitable and remunerative prices for Africas products should be guaranteed; and any agreement with EEC should not affect intra-African co-operation. The negotiations, based on the foregoing principles as African (and to some extent the entire ACP) collective position, led to the signing of a new umbrella convention in the Togolese capital, Lome, on February 28, 1975 between 46 ACP countries and then 9 members of the EEC to cover a five year period - hence its christening as the Lome Convention. This Convention was seen by both sides as ushering in a New Beginning. Hopes were high that this new beginning would be characterized by economic relations based on partnership and equality between industrialized and non-industrialized countries. The first Lome I agreement was signed in 1975 Reviewed and updated every five years, Lome Conventions represented the worlds largest financial and economic framework for North-south cooperation. C) Experiences under Lome I and II Trade and Development Equitable trade relationship that was sought by the ACP countries was never realized. The EEC, concerned more about the need to protect their farmers as guaranteed under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), effectively undermined ACP products access to European markets. Three provisions in the Convention namely granting of duty-free access to EEC markets of ACP exports, the Rules of Origin clause and the safeguard clause - were effectively used to deny ACP countries any benefits from this relationship. The duty-free provision, which was supposed to be non-reciprocal, was qualified in that all agricultural exports competing with EEC farmers products were not accorded duty free status. Instead, they were subjected to import levies and quota restrictions. The net effect was price rise for these products in the European markets and the creation of an export subsidies fund for the European products to the ACP countries. Thus, preference for ACP products in non-EEC countries was only over products that Europe could not produce. The safeguard clause allowed the EEC to unilaterally withdraw the privileges which the ACP countries enjoyed if they were deemed to be causing a serious disturbance in that sector of production or in any member states economies. This rule could be applied arbitrarily. The Rules of Origin were comprehensively defined and applied to products that were wholly obtained in one or more ACP state. The bottom line was that products that had undergone processing and which contained not less than 50 per cent value-added within the ACP countries would be excluded. This restricted ACP countries from purchasing parts of products from third countries other than EEC countries. The outcome was serious limitation of ACP products exported to EEC countries, discouraging the growth of manufacturing and processing industries as well as undermining of the development of integrated economies within the ACP state. STABEX and Price Support The STABEX scheme and other price stabilizing systems attached to the Convention under various protocols were seen as cushions for ACP countries products against price fluctuations of primary commodities. STABEX originally covered 29 commodities which fell into 12 categories of products. Later, other commodities were brought in to bring the number of products to 40. However, the mechanism for operating this system made it to be of little benefit to the ACP countries. To begin with these countries had to show that their export earnings from the listed products were at least 7.5 per cent of their total earning from commodity exports during the 12 months preceding the year of application in order to trigger the schemes provisions in their favour. This was called the dependence threshold. For African countries it was further supplemented by a requirement that for them to qualify for actual entitlements, their real earnings from each individual product has to be not less than 7.5 per cent (2.5 per cent for the landlocked and island countries). Under Lome II, these were reduced to 6.5 per cent (2 per cent for LLICs). For each ACP country, a reference level was calculated corresponding to the component of export earnings during the four years preceding each year of application in a kind of shifting reference points. This was called the reference period. The difference between the reference level and actual earnings constituted the basis of financial transfer, which assumed to be automatic once all of the above elements were present. Provisions were made for minor restrictions. These went a long way to weaken the ability of the scheme to meet its objectives. Besides, the foregoing further restrictions in the STABEX Scheme were laid down as below. only commodities defined for EEC home use or which were under inward processing arrangement would be eligible for STABEX treatment. This restriction excluded shortfalls in export earnings to other countries. Although Lome II tried to improve the situation, it just limited it to intra-ACP exports, which were minimal. ACP countries had to certify that the STABEX commodities had originated from their countries, this inhibited African countries from developing trade with other countries. restriction was on volume of resources available for the scheme under a stipulation that requests for transfer of resource under the scheme would be examined in the light of the volume of resources available. This gave the EEC Commission discretionary power in spite of the contractual nature of the convention. there was restriction that STABEX resources would not be used to meet shortfalls if the shortfalls were the result of trade policy measures of the ACP states which adversely affected exports to the community or where total export of the requesting ACP state showed a significant change. The Commission later defined this to mean a 10 per cent divergence in export earnings. This European Development Fund (EDF) was to fund STABEX under Lome I and II to the tune of EUA 375m and EUA 550m respectively. In proportions, Lome II represented some12 per cent. In the eyes of the EEC and observers, the scheme was a success. To critics, however, the financial problems that bedeviled ACP countries in the 1980s had direct roots in economic structures that the Convention reinforced and which were later blamed for the failures. For instance, commodities that receive most funding like groundnuts, cotton and rough timber are those that reinforced the colonial division of labour. 43 per cent of the total disbursement under this agreement was to only 5 countries, which produced these commodities. By the time of Lome II, STABEX scheme was already in trouble. In 1980, the EDF could only pay 53% of the legitimate claims submitted by the ACP countries. This came down to only 40 per cent in 1982. In 1987, the Commission decided that only 43 of the 70 claims submitted were eligible and of these only 29 were funded. In its later evaluation and assessment of the period, the EEC commission came nearer to appreciating the real issues behind the failures when it came to a conclusion that problems were connected with the loss of competitiveness of the commodities covered by STABEX. It was noted that ACP countries had in fact become more dependent on EEC than before the Convention and that this was a matter of serious consideration for the future (Hewitt, 1983). Besides, the price support level did not earmark any funds to support direct producers. Existing data suggest that funds went into supporting balance of payments. This stemmed, in part, from the need to pay for import from the EEC, from military expenses and frivolities for the bureaucrats. SYSMIN Under Lome II a new system called SYSMIN (System Minerais) was agreed upon and 280 million ECUs were set aside. This money was not for stabilising prices but rather to maintain productive capacity of the ACP state that depended on an agreed list of mineral. Included in this list were alumina, bauxite, cobalt, copper, iron ore, tin roasted iron, manganese, phosphates and pyrites. Energy minerals were excluded. This scheme did not allow new investment in mineral except on condition that risk capital was applied which allowed investors to hold equity shares in the mines. The scheme was thus used to re-privatise the mines under EEC control. Sugar Protocol The Sugar Protocol guaranteed the price of sugar for a number of former British sugar producing counties and India (a non-ACP member). Under the arrangement, ACP countries were to receive guaranteed prices for 1.3 million tons of sugar with Africa supplying 51 per cent the Caribbean 35 per cent and Pacific 13 per cent. India was to supply the remaining 1 per cent. Negotiated annually, the price was to take into account all relevant economic factors. Granted, the ACP states were paid prevailing market prices. However, the EEC increased subsidy for sugar beet production by its members and insisted that the ACP countries meet the transport costs under the protocol, which increased production and freight costs by more than 150 per cent for ACP countries. The continued dumping of excess beet sugar on the world market by the EEC further depressed the sugar prices in non - EEC markets where many ACP countries sell the remainder of their sugar. The dumping only worsened the very problem STABEX sought to solve. Aid and Financial Co-operation The EDF was set up to finance aid to EEC approved economic projects. It was first used to salvage groundnuts during a crisis period. Under the Convention, aid and financial cooperation were very important aspects of assistance to the ACP countries. But these objectives were never met as the principal thrust of aid was to finance only projects that did not threaten European economies. Another tactic was to use grants to frustrate African development. Under Lome I and II, outright grants in the two Lome Conventions constituted more than half the package. Apart from STABEX and SYSMIN funding - which accounted for part of the package - special loans for specific needs as well as risk capital appeared to represent a small package. The rationale was to lower production cost of raw materials for EEC private capital. It is suggested that the aid package under Lome I was only about 75 per cent of the level achieved under Yaounde II. D) Lome III-IV As the above scenario worsened, the EEC began to acknowledge that while Lome II had a number of useful innovations, the actual results were disappointing. The Commission observed that by the time of Lome III it was obvious that Africas decline, for example, was not merely a temporary phenomenon but an enduring one. This decline was, however, almost wholly attributed to errors of omission and commission of ACP countries. According to the EU, the principle of partnership was eroded due to weak institutions and in many cases inefficient administrations in the ACP, which thus encouraged the Commission to adopt a more interventionist role. (TWN Africa, 1997). The policies of economic assistance are supposed to have failed due to the institutional and economic policy situation in the ACP countries while lack of infrastructure purportedly was responsible for the failure of trade preferences (TWN Africa, 1997) New elements were, therefore, built in the policies which were advanced by Edgar Pisani. The Pisani Memorandum advocated a grassroots convention which would be more human than the existing economic and commercial one. Under the new policy dispensation, more attention was to be paid to least developed countries and the sections of population most in need. The Pisani Manifesto outlined four scenarios as the pillars of the new policy dialogue. The donor gives money without caring about the use to which it is put. The donor gives money after being assured of how it is to be used. The donor provides the money and asks to discuss how it is to be used. The donor giving the money after a discussion and agreement. Four pilot schemes were tried in Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Zambia. In these schemes the EEC dictated the policy instruments to be applied in agricultural development. The Lome III Convention (1985-1990) was a mere reflection of the EEC policies. The only difference was the emphasis given to dialogue. Some attempts were also made at improving the STABEX scheme. The coverage was extended to include dried bananas, mangoes and shea nuts oil. The dependency and fluctuating thresholds were reduced to 6 per cent and 1.5 per cent for LDCs and LLICs respectively. The methodology of calculating the transfers was also revised. Lome IV (1990-2000) did not differ fundamentally from Lome III. The only new innovations were the incorporation, for the first time, of human rights (art 5); heavy dose of structural adjustment policies; its life running 10 years as opposed to the traditional five years (with mid-term review in 1995); and the introduction of the idea of decentralized cooperation. 3. UNDERSTANDING THE COTONOU PARNERSHIP AGREEMENT The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States on the one hand and the European Community and its Member States, on the other, replaced the four Lome Conventions that had four a quarter century (1975 to 2000) defined and guide the economic and political relationship between these two sets of countries. The overarching objective of the Cotonou Agreement is stated as the reduction, with a view to eventual eradication, of poverty while contributing to sustainable development and to the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. While Article 167 (1) of the Fourth Lome Convention stated that the objective of economic and trade cooperation was to promote trade between the ACP States and the Community, the objective under the Cotonou Agreement has been fundamentally revised to foster the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in ACP countries. These objectives of removing progressively all barriers to trade between the Parties and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade are to be achieved through the negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 3.1 Principles of The Agreement It is imperative that we look at the set of basic principles that guide the partnership. They are outlined as: Equality of Partners and Ownership of development Strategies In principle, the space for development policy formulation by the ACP States is not only recognised but also securely protected as it is deemed that ACP States, in all their sovereignty, shall determine how their societies and economies will develop. In practice, other considerations are paramount. Participation The principle of participation is diffused throughout the Partnership document. Apart from the central government through its executive arm, the legislature is also brought on board via the Joint Parliamentary assembly (JPA). The Partnership is also open to other actors such as the civil society, private sector, and the local government. It is, however, important to interrogate the nature and quality of this participation. Dialogue and Mutual Obligation By entering the Partnership Agreement, the parties undertake certain mutual obligations like good governance, respect for human rights etc. these are to be monitored through dialogue. Differentiation and Regionalisation Recognition of different levels of development of all partners is seen to be an important element in the agreement. Faithful to the maxim that equal treatment of unequals is injustice, it is underscored that the Partnership Agreements will vary in accordance with the Partners level of development, its unique needs, its performance and its long-term development strategy. 3.2 Innovations of The Cotonou Agreement Although fundamental problems of the Lome Conventions have not been addressed in the new partnership agreement (Cotonou), there are areas of innovation that were absent in the Lome regime that can be seized by different actors in the ACP countries to further engagement with the EU. These include: Political Dialogue The Lome Conventions were negotiated and implemented through the bureaucrats. Even though the bureaucrats will still occupy a central in these negotiations and implementation, there is a new emphasis on political dialogue in the Cotonou agreement. The dialogue covers a fairly broad range of political issues that hitherto fell outside the province of the Lome Conventions. Sadly, the issues listed mostly emanate from those that were considered important by the EU (even though important to ACP States as well) like peace and security, the arms trade, migration etc. Issues like policy autonomy, the role of developmental state and the asymmetric relations that have characterised the partnership are not explicitly addressed. The EU, during the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, had wanted good governance included as an essential element, meaning sanctionable. However, after long discussions, it was agreed that it be treated as a fundamental element, meaning that by itself it would not be sufficient ground for aid suspension but that serious cases of corruption could trigger discussions, possibly leading to aid suspension as a last resort. It is the intention of both parties that the joint ACP-EU institutions like the JPA and ACP-EU Council of Ministers will play amore active and effective role in bringing to table political matters that affect both sides to the Agreement. Recognition of New Actors The second innovation in the agreement relates to the participation of non-stste actors and local authorities. Here, the complimentary role these actors can play to central governments is duly recognised. The governments of ACP States will continue to be responsible for the determination of the development strategy for their countries. Yet, it is envisaged that non-state actors (NGOs, trade unions, farmers associations, private sector) and local authorities will be involved in consultations and planning of national development strategies, provided with access to financial resources, and involved in the implementation programmes. They are supposed to be provided with capacity building support. Among these new actors, the most attention has been given to the private sector, which the Agreement explicitly recognises engine for development. A comprehensive action programme for support with a new investment facility to stimulate regional and international investment is in place on top of being able for the first time to directly access funding from the European Investment Bank (EIB) without requiring a State guarantee. Trade Cooperation Perhaps the most radical area of change is to be found in the area of trade cooperation. Under the quarter century of the Lome Conventions, ACP countries enjoyed non-reciprocal trade preferences from the EU. This is now endangered as the EU leads the onslaght on ACP and other developing countries to move towards WTO compatibility. Under the Cotonou Agreement, the current all-ACP non-reciprocal trade preferences will be maintained until December 31, 2007. Thereafter, beginning January 2008, a new arrangement that demands reciprocity under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will replace them consequent to the negotiations that were launched in September 2002 and whose Phase I was slated to end in September 2003. The EPAs would be WTO-compatible, meaning that essentially all trade will be covered and will include provisions for cooperation other than trade (e.g. Structural Adjustment). However, not all ACP countries have to get in a reciprocal relationship with the EU after 2008. The Least developed Countries among them (LDCs) can keep non-reciprocal Lome- type trade preferences or even improved versions thereof under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the EU. Non-LDCs who decide that they are not in a position to enter into EPAs could transfer into the EUs Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a non-reciprocal set of preferences less attractive than Lome. They could also opt for alternative WTO-compatible arrangements. Programming The fourth innovation is in the realm of programming, which include what is called performance-based aid management, the simplification of instruments and rolling programming. Fixed financial aid allocations that did not take cognisance of performance has now been replaced by a more flexible and selective aid regime which evaluates each countrys needs and performance and adjusts financial resources accordingly. On paper, this means more resources can be channelled to good performers and bad performers lose out. The reality is that this is used for political control. 4. UNPACKING EPAs Although the Cotono Agreement as a whole differs significantly from its predecessors (Lom conventions), it is in the area of trade and development cooperation where the divergence is largest. In contrast to the Lom preferential trade arrangements, new trading arrangements in Cotono agreement are to be Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements signed with different ACP regions or countries, based on regional integration initiatives (Economic Partnerships Agreements, EPA). 4.1 EPAs: Are they FTAs or Economic Partnerships? An Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is the joining of two regional trading arrangements (RTAs), with the EU on one side and a group of ACP countries on the other, and therefore forming a North-South RTA. Their formal negotiations were foreseen to begin by September 2002 and are expected to end by December 2007 (the preparatory period), and are to take into account the regional integration process within the ACP countries. In addition to being Free Trade areas, EPAs also have a financial dimension accompanying them to facilitate their implementation. EPAs shall ostensibly aim at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries (EU General Affairs Council (2002). EPAs have two main principles: a) Reciprocity Trade within the EPA will be on reciprocal basis. This implies that while maintaining their preferential access to the EU, the ACP countries have to gradually open up their markets for the European products. b) Regionally based While the EU is a political and an economic entity in itself, the ACP group is not. Signing the FTA collectively as a regional group will help ACP countries develop their own intra-ACP dialogue structures, define their common objectives and interests in multilateral fora and improve their negotiating skills as an economic or a political group even outside their relations with the EU, will increase economic size of different ACP states therefore making them more likely to attract private foreign direct investment (European commission, 1996). ACP trade interests would be best depended by representatives of the different ACP regions, or countries and regional negotiators would be better aware of the particular sectoral interests at stake at their regional producers (ECDPM, 1998). c) Special treatment to LDCs In its efforts to take account of different needs and development levels of the ACP countries, the trade cooperation provides a special and differentiated treatment for ACP least developed countries (LDCs). The 39 ACP LDCs are not obliged to sign an EPA to access the EU. They can still continue to access the EU market for essentially all products under the Lom type trade arrangement. In addition, the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the EU gives all the LDCs access to the EU markets duty free. On paper, the intention of EPAs designers was to attain several objectives, chief among them: Strengthen the integration between ACP and EU countries Promote the economic liberalization of ACP economies Deepen ACP regional integration processes Increase access for European companies to ACP markets The reality, however, is at variance with the above. What EPAS promise to deliver as they are currently proposed are: Appending not integrating ACP markets to the EU productive system as markets for manufactured, processed and value-added products and source for cheap inputs. De-industrialize ACP countries through the pushing of ACP countries to liberalize at a sub-optimal rate as compared to what they would do unilaterally. Hinder diversification of ACP trade with non-EU trading partners Undermine home-grown process of regional integration, through creation of new and largely artificial geographical configurations (e.g. in SADC and ESA regions) and undermine the collective solidarity the ACP block had forged during negotiations with the EU. Increasing profit margins of European exporters, rather than lowering the prices to ACP consumers and importers. d) WTO Compatibility Incompatibility with WTO rules is the key argument the EU has proffered to justify the termination of Lome-based non-reciprocal preferences. They correctly argue that these preferences infringe upon non-discrimination principle established by Article XXIV of GATT 1994. However, the following are worth noting: While Article 36.1 of the Cotonou Agreement requires that ACP-EU arrangement should conform to WTO requirements, it has to be read together with Article 34.4 which states that the WTO compatibility must include conformity with Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) requirements. Article XXIV of GATT was developed in 1947 and did not envisage an FTA between developed and developing countries. Article XXIV of GATT is being renegotiated as part of the Doha Round and ACP countries have submitted proposals for the inclusion of S&D therein. Part V of the GATT 1994 provides that there is no need for reciprocity for concession given to developing countries by developed ones. Footnote 2 of the Enabling Clause allows RTAs between developed and developing countries even though they do not comply with other WTO provisions. The USA has used this footnote to obtain waivers for its similar arrangements with Caribbean and Andes countries. Paragraph 10 of Article XXIV provides that RTAs not in full conformity with the rules of Art. XXIV may still be allowed if two-thirds of the Members agree. This can easily be achieved if there is goodwill on the part of EU since the ACP-EU countries are more than two-thirds of WTO membership (103 out of 150) Article V of GATS explicitly requires consideration of a wider process of economic liberalization, and flexibility in applying the rules where developing countries are parties to the arrangement. Waivers are allowed under Article IX of GATT. 4.2 IMPLICATION OF EPAs A) Positive Impacts EPAS will Facilitate Flow of Development Finance It has been cited by the European Commission and some ACP countries that the EU loans provided to Kenya and other ACP countries for public and private sector development, through European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Development Fund (EDF) in the Cotonou Agreement, have made a significant contribution as lack of credit is one of the leading bottlenecks in the country. Such loans have gone into such key sectors of the Kenyan economy as tea, infrastructure, water supply, tourism, and micro and small enterprises (MSEs). However, such loans have been inadequate. Incentive for Export It has been argued that the liberalization in domestic policy regimes, a precondition of an EPA would increase the incentive to export. Increased competition in import-competing sectors and increased relative incentives to produce goods for export is seen as a stimulus to improving resource allocation to reducing inefficiencies and rent seeking activities and ultimately to raising of productivity and growth of GDP. Increased Foreign Direct Investment Removal of such barriers to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the performance criteria, lack of national treatment and foreign exchange restrictions are seen as a harbinger of good things to come as far attraction of foreign investors is concerned. Proponents of EPAs as are currently being negotiated aver that more FDIs will mean more jobs and transfer of technology. Lowered Costs of Production Liberalization will allow domestic companies to purchase better and cheaper inputs that may lead to lower prices and better quality consumer products. In addition to increasing the general availability of raw materials and inputs, their lower prices will contribute to reduction of the current high costs of production. Increased Competitiveness Due to exposure, the EPA may improve the overall competitiveness of the Kenyan economy, unlock efficient production structures and improve the performance of the Kenya exports. Expansion of Regional Markets The EPA will create larger regional markets, therefore allowing economies of scale and competition effects. Such a North-South trade arrangement may lead to technology spill over through FDI and may offer development of new opportunities of manufacturing and engineering. B) Negative Impacts  EPAs Will Hurt Farmers There has been a fairly consistent expansion of EU exports of prepared and preserved tomatoes to Kenya (although still below 1,000 tons) This is an area of concern because of the role local processing plays as a safety valve for the fresh tomatoes market. By providing an outlet for surplus tomatoes at peak times of the year, the local tomatoes processing industry helps sustain producer prices for fresh tomatoes. Without this safety valve production peaks could lead to substantial income losses for local tomato farmers and a stagnation or contraction of the sector. Perhaps an area of more concern is the EU exports of dried vegetables. These exports rose from 111 tons in 1993 to 7,717.8 tons in 2002 before falling back to 3,362.5 tons in 2003. Since the reform of the EU fruit and vegetable regime has been underway since 2000 with a move away from guaranteed prices to direct to farmers, prices of processed vegetable products are likely to fall. This could fuel continued exports of processed vegetable products to Kenya, which in 2002 represented the third largest category of EU food and agricultural exports to Kenya. A reciprocal arrangement, which eliminates duties on their imports will make them much more cheaper, depress local farmers prices and put many small scale vegetable and fruit producers out of business. EPAs Will Hurt Workers Measures of non-discrimination between foreign investors and national investors, or among foreign investors, means that a country cannot promote one particular company. While this might avoid corruption, it also means that a country cannot support the development of a national industry or a particular foreign company that better suits the needs of the country. The EU is also interested in measures that liberalize the movement of capital. Investors want to repatriate their profits freely out of the country without obligations to reinvest in the country. They also want to make all kind of payments with other countries. Such free movements of capital can have a negative effect in the stability of a country's currency and thus the economy of a country. In the EPA negotiations as in other investment agreements, the issue of misbehaviour towards workers or towards consumers by foreign investors are not covered. Cases of abuse have to be dealt with at the national level and with national regulations. However, for many countries it is difficult to deal with foreign investors who can threaten to leave the country when stricter laws or measures are being introduced. EPAs Will Hurt Women The EPAs are envisaged to culminate in strictly reciprocal market access arrangements, unaccommodating of SDT, even though both the EU and its ACP partners have said that they are committed to respecting and operationalizing SDT in the WTO, and the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement also formally recognizes this principle. If EPA negotiations stick to the current free trade area framework, tariffs on almost all trade between the two blocs will be cut to zero, even for Kenya and other poor countries that rely on tariffs for crucial government revenue. Locking in tariff reductions or elimination would eviscerate Kenya's already very low public revenues, further exacerbating the discrimination that Kenyan women experience, in three main ways. First, lower tariff revenues would heighten the exposure of women in the agricultural sector to food insecurity by reducing the funds available for much-needed agricultural investment and provision of agricultural-related services. Moreover, tariffs utilized in the manner of the WTO's SSM are often the primary, if not the only, trade instruments open to developing agricultural economies to safeguard farmers' livelihoods in the face of sharp price swings or surges in imports, but free trade areas like the proposed EPAs do not permit safeguard duties, or allow only for transitional safeguards at such low levels as to strip out any meaningful safeguard function. It is even possible that if Kenya applied a WTO-permissible SSM if high levels of subsidized EU produce flooded the Kenyan market and displaced local production, Kenya could face economic sanctions for violation of EPA rules. Thus, the EPA in the form it is likely to be adopted, would make it difficult for Kenya to comply with CEDAW, in particular its Articles 11, 12 and 14. Second, lower tariffs would imperil the distribution of emergency food supplies. Thirdly, liberalization-induced decreases in State tariff revenues translate into reductions in the provision of basic services. The States reduced capacity to fulfill social obligations has serious implications for its ability to uphold human rights. Women are the first to be required to compensate, for instance by expanding their role as caregivers, even further increasing their workload. EPAs Will Hurt the Poor Kenyan imports from the EU, as opposed to her exports to the same destination, are well diversified and comprise mostly manufactured goods, which attract high world prices. These products also compete with the Kenyan manufacturing sector, which is relatively developed and diversified. Surprisingly, among Kenyan imports from the EU are Worn clothing and other worn articles (Mitumba) in which Kenya is expected to have a comparative advantage. Probably this can be attributed to the collapse of the textile industry in Kenya or the reverse trade where exported textile products are imported again after use. Table 2: Top ten Kenya imports from EU in 3 digit (2001) USD SITCDescriptionValue in (USD)% Share to total Revenue76418000Other telephone or graphic apparatus 22,842,380  7.70 26901000Clothing, clothing accessories 14,611,322  4.92 71311000Aircraft engine 13,309,578  4.49 78219220Motor car vehicles for transport of good exceeding 5 tons 7,032,686  2.37 76384900Other sound recording apparatus in cooperating sound production  4,762,567  1.60 71690000Parts suitable for machines 4,688,876  1.58 76415000Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus 4,316,953  1.45 79295000Other parts of aeroplanes or helicopter 3,864,027  1.30 11241100Whiskeys, in containers holding 2L or less 3,733,530  1.26 04121000Other wheat and meslin, unmilled 3,733,530  1.26 Total top ten 82,845,938  27.92 Total revenue 296,742,216 Source: Customs and Excise Dept (KRA) The system of trade envisaged in the EPAs is total liberalization of trade leading to free trade. This implies that the tariff regimes in existence and any other regimes foreseen should be eliminated and replaced with a zero tariff regime. In theory, free trade will maximize the growth targets in many countries. Free trade envisages removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to create a world in which there is free movement of goods and services and capital. However, due to migration laws of the EU, free movement of labor, an important factor of production remains contentious. In the end, this should, theoretically, eliminate structural impediments to trade, reduce the costs of trade transactions and increase consumer welfare in the whole world. There are, however, many challenges before then. The elimination of tariffs means a substantial loss of revenue to African governments in particular. Most of the ACP countries rely almost wholly on import duties and value added tax on imports to finance both development and recurrent government expenditure. Thus it is not viable to remove tariffs without making any compensating variations in the structure of the governments revenue. The new ACP-EU agreement recognizes this. In the Cotonou agreement, the parties agreed to conclude new WTO-compatible trading arrangements between them, while progressively removing barriers between them. The agreement is clear that its primary objective is to foster the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and their development priorities, thereby promoting the sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP states (Art. 34 (1)). Despite the preferences granted to the ACP states in the EU market, their performance has been disappointing. Estimates show that the share of ACP imports into the EU market declined steadily over the years from around 7% in 1975 to about 3.5% in 1997. Similarly, the share of EU imports from Africa fell from 6.8% to 2.5% over the same period. This clearly calls for a renewed effort to increase the ACP, and in particular, the African, share of exports to the EU. Fiscal Implications of Trade Liberalization The full liberalization of trade will have major implications for government revenue in Kenya. There will be loss of revenue from import duties and value added tax on imports. Currently, these two contribute slightly over 25% of total government revenue. It is expected that this will be translated into cutbacks on development and social welfare programs. These cutbacks will adversely affect growth and make it difficult to meet sectoral targets for growth. Also the government has been a major producer of goods and services. Although this share of overall production is declining, the fall in revenue from tariffs may severely inhibit the production capacity of the government, at least in the short and medium term. Elimination of tariffs, however, is expected to increase consumer welfare. If tariff elimination translates into lower prices, it is expected to lead to increased consumption. Economic analysis of Kenya government revenue Analysis of the Kenya governments revenue structure indicates that the government depends on income tax as its largest component of revenue. Figure 1 below shows that income tax accounts for 30% of the total. Value added tax (VAT) on imports and import duties account for 11.9% and 13.7% of the revenue respectively. Taken together, import duties and VAT on imports account for 25.8% of the revenue. This is the direct amount of revenue the government will lose with the liberalization of trade with the outside world. The current revenue structure shows that there is very little room for immediate substitution of revenue sources. The different sources are dissimilar and often unstable. For example, income tax is a fairly stable tax source. However, it depends on the state of the employment sector. During times of restructuring and re-trenchment, the tax from this source may decline substantially. Similarly, excise duty may show stability during times of strong economic growth, but this may weaken during economic slowdowns. Figure 1. Share of government revenue by source Budgetary challenges The overall challenge of the government is to balance the budget. This means increasing revenue collections or in its absence, cutting back on expenditure. The former option has yielded limited results as fiscal revenue has risen only marginally in the last ten years. The latter option is part of a package of reforms being undertaken by government, but this poses serious implications on the social stability of the country. Further, the government needs even more financial resources in order to execute the expenditure cutbacks. Given the current revenue structure, the governments options are severely limited. A shortfall in any single item of revenue will have destabilizing effects on the rest of the budget. Trade liberalization and trends in tariff revenues Table 3: Kenyas imports and exports by region 2002-2006 IMPORTS20022003200420052006TOTALEuropean Union83090668408715993176114737 =SUM(LEFT) 445002Other W.Europe 4077 53045722780110392 =SUM(LEFT) 33296Eastern Europe168854995675509310405 =SUM(LEFT) 28360America1914418173244585182832327 =SUM(LEFT) 145930Africa2887337318524356269863381 =SUM(LEFT) 244705Middle East5131575440100228107742120008 =SUM(LEFT) 454733Far East666237114585818111159166515 =SUM(LEFT) 501260Australia/Oceanic20181731146216473092 =SUM(LEFT) 9950Others88239516001948626 =SUM(LEFT) 5451TOTAL IMPORTS =SUM(ABOVE) 257710 =SUM(ABOVE) 281845 =SUM(ABOVE) 364557 =SUM(ABOVE) 443092 =SUM(ABOVE) 521483 =SUM(LEFT) 1868687EXPORTSEuropean Union4579552159567736256465480 =SUM(LEFT) 282771Other W.Europe23302718220822873897 =SUM(LEFT) 13440Eastern EuropeAmerica4107388060661325921487 =SUM(LEFT) 48799Africa8308584653101809120790108306 =SUM(LEFT) 498643Middle East70656604746590169714 =SUM(LEFT) 39864Far East1884921177255742967628201 =SUM(LEFT) 123477Australia/Oceanic559747618894723 =SUM(LEFT) 3541Others60996639123292033611147 =SUM(LEFT) 56550TOTAL EXPORTS169241183154214793260422250993 =SUM(LEFT) 1078603 Table 4 shows that the European Union and Africa (mainly COMESA countries) are still Kenyas largest trading partner. The EU accounts for nearly 30% of Kenyas imports and about a similar percentage in exports. Clearly, the greatest decline is anticipated to come from this region. At the same time, the European Union is also the largest market for our exports. Further expansion in exports is likely to take place in this region as well. Implications of EPAs on fiscal revenue: the sensitive areas The revenue structure of the government of Kenya indicates that there are mainly eight sources of revenue. These sources exclude borrowing and bilateral support as we are mostly concerned with the fiscal implications of EPAs. The figures, however, vary across the years due in part to the structural changes that occur in the countrys economy over time. Further, income brackets and import tariffs are changed as government economic policy shifts in response to domestic and international economic changes. The revenue effects of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) will be felt through a number of sensitive areas. These areas include: Production of goods and services. The government is still a major producer of goods and services, mainly through its state corporations and line ministries. These goods and services include agricultural commodities, banking, finance and insurance and tourism. In the short term, the decline in the revenue status of the government will mean reduced capacity for production. This is especially so for the firms, which depend wholly on government funding. These include the regional development authorities and local authorities throughout the country. Social security payments. The government and some of its parastatal firms are major contributors to social insurance. The National Social Security Fund and other social security funds, including pension and provident funds depend on government for employers share of the contributions. This sector is expected to feel the effect of EPAs through reduced contributions from the government. Transfers to local authorities. Local authorities have been shown to be mostly unviable on their own. They depend on central government for their annual budgetary support through the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) and secondment of chief officers. EPAs may result in cutbacks in transfers to local authorities, which may have immediate adverse effect on the provision of services to the local people. Financing social services. Financing social services, including education and health, water and sanitation is still a major problem for the government, even with current budgetary position. Financial allocations to health and education are still far below the required levels. If EPAs reduce overall revenue substantially, there has to be sufficient compensating for social services to prevent them from collapse. The services sector is highly developed in the EU and provides for most of the EU's jobs, income and economic growth. The EU is the worlds major exporter and importer of services and a major investor around the world. It has many very large service multinationals that operate worldwide. The ACP countries are exporting little services (1.5% of world exports in 2000), mainly tourism (mode 2), and do not have many services' investors abroad. Although services play an important role in many developing countries, they are mostly for national use and are not so highly developed as in the industrialized countries. This means that EPAs which would include trade in services would provide much less potential export benefits to the ACP than to the EU. There would be unbalanced trade in services between the ACP and the EU. Liberalization of services and importing new services means that a country allows foreign services and their providers to enter the national market and has to eliminate measures that discriminate between foreign and national services (providers). This is a complex process, which has not only benefits such as new and efficient services, but also negative effects. Problems caused by foreign service providers are for instance that they: focus on rich clients and neglect of poor consumers (e.g. in health and financial services), rapidly dominate the market and closing of local service providers, only work with big suppliers (e.g. foreign supermarkets mainly source their products from large farms and large industries), focus on short term profits, and repatriate their profits to the headquarters abroad. In case services are liberalized, the right regulations need to be introduced or to be in place and supervisory instruments need to ensure their implementation so that consumers are protected. This is costly, needs time as well as the necessary expertise, which is often lacking in Kenya and other developing countries (and even in the industrialized countries). EPAs Will Undermine Regional Integration The EPA configuration for Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) undermines our efforts at regional integration by East African states, which have already signed a protocol to establish a Customs Union. Why should Kenya and Uganda be lumped together under one configuration (ESA) while Tanzania, a partner in the EACU, is consigned to another (SADC)? This flies in the face of one of the fundamental principles of the agreement, namely to build on on-going efforts at regional integration. The EPA negotiations in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) undermines all the efforts at regional integration that have been taken since early 1980s and basically leaves only four countries - Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe - vulnerable. Of the sixteen countries that make up the configuration, 12 of them are LDCs and as such are under no great pressure to negotiate; especially if there will be no additional resources since they are already benefiting from the EUs Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. Given that Mauritius and Seychelles can make a case, being SIDS, and also enjoy special treatment, this might leave Kenya eventually forced to sign individually, especially given the current relations between Zimbabwe and the EU. Moreover, both ESA and SADC as defined under EPA are artificial constructs that have no legal or historical bases. EPAs Will Hurt Fisherfolk Countries of the EU are Kenyas main export market for fish. In the year 2006, However, due to increased export of frozen fish from the EU into Kenya, coupled with intermittent ban on Kenyan fish by the EU, there has been a steady increase in import of the EUs frozen fish into the country. In 2006, Kenyas earning from fish and fish preparations decreased by 14% to KSh 3.9 billion fom KSh 4.6 billion in 2005. The table below shows a trend, which is expected to increase phenomenally if EPAs introduce reciprocity and tariffs, are eliminated. This will put many artisanal fisherfolk out of income, thereby deepening the already entrenched poverty in the fishing regions of the country (Nyanza, Coast and North Rift Valley) Table 4: EU Exports of Frozen Fish To Kenya (Euro 1,000) 199319941995199619971998199920002001*03031,3282,111,131358,744412,132588,013955,283875,768732,15 In tonnage terms imports of fish have risen from 184.5 tons in 1994 to 9,808 tons in 2001, before falling back to 2046.6 tons in 2003. 19931994199519961997199819992000200103030,1184,50,21753,14271,92,139,75,793,35,335,89,808,3 EPAs Will Undermine Local Business Kenyan trade with the EU countries, like with the rest of the world is largely in favour of imports and the country has had a historical trade deficit with the EU. Primary agricultural commodities such as unprocessed coffee, tea, pyrethrum, hides and skins, flowers, fruits and vegetables, and fish have been the countrys main exports to the EU.  On the side of imports, these have been mainly: manufactured goods of all kinds (motor vehicles, machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, chemicals, etc), processed foods (e.g. milk powder; canned meat; juices; sugar; confectionery, etc) and alcoholic beverages (wines, etc) as well as other value added goods. a) Direction of Trade In terms of direction of trade by regions the following general picture can be observed: Table 5: Direction of trade with Kenya by regions Rank1st2nd3rd4th5thTotalExports to:COMESAEUFar EastAmericaMiddle EastApproximate Value in K.Sh. Billion.200675 (38%)65 (33%)28 (14%)21 (11%)9 (5%)198Imports from:Far EastMiddle EastEUAmericaCOMESAApproximate Value in K.Sh. Billion. 2006167 (37%)120 (27%)115 (25%) 32 (7%)17 (4%)451Source: Calculations of values and percentages based on Figure 7.12 and 7.14 in CBS, Economic Survey 2007, pp.149&151. A comparison between the value of domestic exports to the EU countries and imports from the same during the last 10-year period (1997-2006) confirms the general picture that imports exceed exports. Clearly the net beneficiaries in the trade relations are the EU member countries. Table 6: Value of Kenyas exports to, and imports from, EU 1997-2006 YearValue of exports (million Kenya Pounds)Value of imports (million Kenya Pounds)20063,274.05,736.920053,128.24,658.820042,838.74,358.020032,608.03,342.020022,186.23,847.620011,927.13,465.520001,934.03,453.419991,845.32,971.419981,753.43,065.519971,907.32,932.6 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey, various years. Ministry of Planning and National Development. b) Terms of Trade The following price indices (for exports to, and imports from, all parts of the world) show the fact that import prices have generally tended to rise faster than export prices, meaning that domestic consumers are forced to pay more for imports than they can afford from their export earnings (Table 3). Thus despite being part of the Lome Conventions, Kenya has had a negative trade balance with the rest of the world. This is one explanation for the increasing poverty in the country due to the reduction in incomes. Table 7: Price indices for all exports and all imports 2002-2006 (1992=100) EXPORTS20022003200420052006Food and live animals545497562577692Beverages and tobacco787209233314539Crude materials (inedible)9488917648531208Mineral fuels589685719745797Animal and vegetable oils and fats702256225311317Chemicals531569448458697Manufactured goods1182127689612761972Machinery and transport equipment751471638674739Miscellaneous manufactured articles13638849398921576All exports657620638676869Non-Oil exports680603614658886IMPORTSFood and live animals536467623605684Beverages and tobacco1186914765745668Crude materials (inedible)503641598578687Mineral fuels57766482210931514Animal and vegetable oils and fats784795973939791Chemicals10671248102710311281Manufactured goods7268076416721079Machinery and transport equipment1598111497710401400Miscellaneous manufactured articles719514662823642All imports8477628249421215Non-Oil exports860718730780980Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. Economic Survey, 2007. Ministry of Planning and National Development. 5. WHAT NEXT? THE ADVOCACY HORIZON 5.1 EPAs Will Be Costly In a leaked letter from the EU Director General Trade, Karl Falkenberg, and the Director General Development, Stefano Manservisi, addressed to Fijian Trade Minister, Kaliopate Tavole, the two admit that there are many costs associated with an EPA. But we should not forget about the benefits. What are these benefits? As already stated above, one of the most advertised benefits of EPAs, according to the EC, is that the agreements will help integrate ACP into global markets and expand their trade. This is unlikely to happen for the reasons outlined below: The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has estimated that Sub-Saharan African governments will lose $ 1,972 million per annum ( 1,516 million at current rates of exchange) in tariff revenues through the full implementation of the kind of EPA envisaged by the EC. In contrast the Commonwealth Secretariat has estimated for this same group of countries fiscal adjustment support needs of 239 million per annum. There are important supply-side constraints that affect Kenya s and other ACP states ability to avail themselves of the opportunities that may be offered by increased trade and compete favorably with foreign traders and investors. These include infrastructure, research capacity, human resources and institutional capacity. Although the EU avers that it will make resources available to address these, three years of EPA negotiations have revealed that there will be no additional EPA adjustment-specific resources . Forcing liberalization before these constraints are satisfactorily addressed will not only prevent the envisaged gains from being realized, they will further damage ACP economies and trade prospects. Already, Africa has lost an estimated US$ 272 billion through two decades of trade liberalization under Structural adjustment programmes and WTO agreements. The EU maintains a myriad of non-tariff trade barriers besides tariff and quotas. These include strict rules of origin and technical barriers like the sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), which adversely affect ACP countries to gain access to EU markets for agricultural products. The ongoing Common Agricultural policy (CAP) reforms will undermine the value of preferences for most ACP products as the EU shifts subsidies from price support to income support. This will lead to significant decline in EU market prices for a range of ACP agricultural exports. There has already occurred a 20% decline in beef prices and sugar prices are poised to fall some 36 percentage points. This has a direct bearing on ACP agricultural export earnings and may even lead to some ACP countries leaving the EU market as Swaziland has already done for its low quality beef cuts. It is the EU exporters that will increase their market access in ACP countries. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has established that EPAs will lead to significant trade creation for EU goods while Africa trade with other non-Eu partners and even intra-regional trade are likely to shrink. 5.2 EPAs Will Not Promote Regional Integration and Trade When a falsehood is repeated so many times, some people begin to believe it. This is true of the assertion that EPAs promote regional integration and intra-regional trade. The fact that Africa has been committed to regional integration long before EPAs happened by can be attested to by the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. This gave a clear roadmap to both economic and political integration. It adopted an incremental approach where Regional Economic Communities were to act as the building blocks for continental integration. It is not by accident that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Economic and monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) exist. The EC tells everybody keen to listen that the primary objective of EPAs is to boost regional trade and integration among ACP countries. The evidence on the ground is at variance with this claim. First, EPA configuration undermines the efforts at regional integration within East Africa. Embarked on barely six weeks into the establishment of the East African Customs Union (EACU), the geographical configuration of the ESA region assaults very viciously the efforts to create a single economic entity for East Africa. Why, pundits ask, should Kenya and Uganda be lumped together under one configuration (ESA) while Tanzania, a partner in the EACU, is consigned to another (SADC)? This flies in the face of one of the fundamental principles of the agreement, namely to build on on-going efforts at regional integration. Secondly, the so-called SADC again makes a joke of the well known economic entity that brings together some 13 southern African countires. The EC recreates a SADC without Malawi, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as South Africa. Regional tariff liberalization has autonomously been going since 1980s. Now EPA-induced elimination of tariffs will lead to EU exports becoming more competitive and crowding out those of African and other ACP countries. Impact assessment done by UNECA shows that a reciprocal EPA would diminish intra-regional trade in all four regions of Africa, thereby exacerbating Africas balance of trade problem - to the benefit of EU exporters. From the foregoing, it can be seen that far from promoting the existing efforts at regional integration, EPA proposals are undermining them. 5.3 Deadlines Are Unrealistic Even though the EC has often taken long periods of time to respond to proposals from the ACP regions (for example, nine months to respond to the SADC framework; three months to write a simple three-page letter as an incomplete response to the Pacific), it continues to pressurise ACP countries arguing that the current WTO waiver will expire in December 2007. When the ECOWAS group proposed to extend negotiations by three years, the EC threatened that if the deadline is not met, the only tariff regime that will be in place on 1 January 2008 will be the GSP. The exports of the West African non-LDCs to the EU would, as a result, be seriously undermined. More than 1 billion of non-LDC exports to the EU, or 9.5 per cent of their total exports, will be submitted to higher tariffs, and will face direct competition with exports from other developing countries.  The ACP negotiators have already cited many reasons to play down the importance of the December 2007 deadline for the EPA negotiations, and proposed to relax the time pressure. One, the EU has missed important deadlines and reneged on commitments (including, for instance having a binding all ACP-EU agreement at the end of Phase 1 and providing timely financial resources for impact studies). Two, almost a year past following the expiry of the Lom waiver in January 2000 before it was renewed, yet no WTO members complained. Three, EPA negotiations were intended to be finalised three years after the end of the Doha negotiations to build on the expected more pro-development multilateral trade rules, including further clarity of flexibilities under WTO/GATT Article XXIV. However, in the Doha negotiations, deadlines have been missed by the day and now there is no clear sign that Doha Round negotiations will resume soon. Without a clear conclusion from the Doha Round, there is no clear urgency for finalising EPA negotiations. In January 2007, AU trade ministers urged all negotiating parties to use the opportunity of the Comprehensive Review of the EPA negotiations to take stock of the negotiations and explore whether to extend the period of the negotiations. 5.4 Aid for trade: blackmailing ACP countries into the EPAs, without offering new support An example of the ECs recalcitrant stance with regard to adjustment resources for EPAs can be seen in their response to various requests by ACP countries for new and additional resources. The Pacific call for additional development support specifically meant to enhance the regions ability to adapt to and benefit from the new trade regime, is dismissed by the ECs letter, which states: this is not acceptable to us. We have jointly spent considerable time during our meetings in the past clarifying this point. In the letter, the EC restates its long-held view that funding will not be provided through the EPA, but instead through its assistance package, the European Development Fund (EDF). A total of 22.7 billion has been pledged for the 10th EDF funding cycle (covering 2008-13 for all 79 ACP countries). This represents a continuation of the EU s ongoing development programmes: it has been estimated that 21.3 billion is needed for the 10th EDF funding cycle just to continue the EUs existing aid portfolio. 5.5 The Waiver Issue: A Non Issue This issue of the re-imposition of import duties on non-LDC exports to the EU from January 1st 2008 can be addressed administratively by the EU and in the first instance does not require a WTO waiver. The question of a WTO waiver only arises once: the temporary extension of Cotonou trade preferences has been challenged; the challenge has been upheld; the EU has launched and appeal; the EU has lost the appeal; the WTO has granted the right for the complainant to impose sanctions on the EU; the EU has determined that these sanctions imposed upon it are so serious as to require resolution at the WTO. This of course will all take time (a minimum of 5 years) and assumes that a WTO member will complain. This is by no means certain, for with the launching of the new raft of FTA negotiations with Latin American and Asian countries, few governments wish to be getting into a major trade dispute with the EU. Symptomatic of this was the decision of Costa Rica not to join Ecuador in its banana case at the WTO. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the US AGOA initiative, launched in 2000 and which was initially set to run until 2008 (subsequently extended to 2015), has had no WTO waiver, yet this initiative is no less discriminatory than a temporary rolling over of the Cotonou trade preferences would be. In many respects therefore the waiver issue is an excuse for not getting fully to grips with the substantive issues faced under EPAs, with the threat of the loss of existing preferences being used to encourage (some would say force) ACP Countries to sign up to EPAs, over which they still have fundamental reservations. 5.6 There Is Alternative to EPAs The Cotonou Agreement legally requires the EU to leave no ACP country worse off after the expiry of Cotonou Preferences, in ways that are compatible with WTO rules. But the European Commission (EC) does not appear to be taking the necessary steps to realize these legal assurances. The EC maintains that there is only one means to fulfil its obligation: a free trade agreement or EPA. If the six negotiating regions do not sign EPAs by the end of December 2007, the EC has declared that it will not continue Cotonou Preferences. Instead, from 1 January 2008 least-developed countries will have to rely on the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme which provides duty-free, quota-free access. All others would have to rely on the standard Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which the EU provides to all developing countries. This is not a viable option. The standard GSP provides far lower preferences than Cotonou and could be devastating for export sectors in ACP countries. But the ECs current EPAs proposals pose a serious threat to ACP economies. The stakes are very high. The EU is the largest trading partner for most ACP countries. As an advanced industrialized economy, it is also one of the most powerful competitors in the world. While it is possible to design an economic relationship that benefits ACP countries, the ECs current proposals threaten to do the opposite. As the deadline draws close, exporters are becoming alarmed at the prospects of facing high tariffs into the EU market. The EU appears to be watching the clock, hoping that as pressure mounts, ACP countries will have no option but to accept their proposals. The EC has refused to accept many constructive offers placed on the table by ACP countries, and has failed to, or delayed in, responding to other requests. The pressure to conclude EPAs in December, which is likely to be on the EUs terms, would mean the abandonment by the ACP of their development proposals. An EPA signed under such circumstances would be an injustice to the millions of people whose futures depend on these negotiations. ACP and EU leaders have a legal and moral obligation to negotiate an agreement that supports development. The choice that the EC is offering between an EPA and the standard GSP is a false one. For LDCs there is the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative that needs to be made a binding agreement as opposed to its current unilateral nature. For the non-LDC members of the ACP bloc, the EC can at the very minimum offer a GSP+ system of preferences. This would provide all ACP countries with a high level of market access for their exports beyond the expiry of Cotonou Preferences, and that ACP countries could well meet the eligibility criteria for GSP+. This would be compatible with WTO rules. With sufficient political will the EU could allow all ACP countries to join GSP+ in 2007. The EC and member states should immediately open up such avenues to ACP countries, so that negotiators can rest assured that current trade would not be disrupted after the end of 2007. Below we show what would be the market access levels for non-LDCs under GSP and GSP-plus regimes. Fig 2: Comparison between current Cotonou terms and GSP terms  Source: Laura Merrill: Presentation at CSO Meeting on Alternatives to EPAs As Figure 3 below shows, there will be hardly any erosion of preferences under a GSP+ arrangement. All that is required is to make these binding in WTO. Fig. 3: Comparison between current Cotonou terms and GSP+ terms  6. PARTING WORDS The EU countries, through the EC is pushing an inflexible market opening agenda in the EPA negotiations, which disregards proposals from ACP countries, undermines the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement and goes far beyond what is required by the WTO regime. EU Member States and the European Commission should seriously consider ACP negotiating proposals not only to honour Cotonous critical partnership principle, but also so as not to cause unreasonable delays in the negotiations. Particularly when the EC is using the pressure of the waiver expiry to force trade arrangements that are not in the ACP regions best interests from a developmental perspective. The EC should take seriously the request for alternatives as required by Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement. This must include arrangements without reciprocal market liberalization, without Singapore Issues, and without WTO plus provisions, particularly in relation to TRIPs. The expected impacts of the different arrangements must be assessed, so that all parties can judge what arrangement would best contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction in the ACP countries. The EU should guarantee the continuation of ACP exports to the EU at their equivalent market access levels should the negotiations not be completed by the end of 2007. REFERENCES Galeano, Eduardo, 1973, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of A Continent, Monthly Review Press, New York. Rodney, Walter, 1972, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle LOuverture, London Third World Network, Africa Secretariat; The International Economic Regime and the Building of ACP Capacity in A Future Lome (Discussion Paper October 1997) Hewitt, A., 1983: Stabex: Time to overhaul the Mechanics (Lome Briefings No. 6 of 1983.)  See Rodneys How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, for a comprehensive treatment of this issue  Lome I was signed in the backdrop geopolitical power of African countries in the context of the Cold war, the oil crisis and the ideological debate on a New International Economic Order. The courier: No.31 Special Issue, March 1975, p.2  Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement.  EPAs were originally referred to as Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs).  The membership is 104 is South Africa is included (27 EU member countries and 77 ACP states).  WTO, World Trade Report 2004, p. 21 (Appendix Tabel IA.2)  D. W. te Velde, Special and differential treatment in Post-Cotonou Services negotiations, Trade Negotiations Insights, ECDPM, May 2004, p. 4-5.  Economic Survey 2007, p.140  See Christian Aid: The Economics of Failure: The Real Cost of Free Trade for Poor Countries, June 2005  UNECA: Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements, APTC Briefing No. 6.  UNECA Regional Integration Study 2006 . See also Christian Aid, op. cit.  See Breaking Cotonou Spirit,  EC, letter to West African negotiators, no date, ca. December 2006. Argumentaire. Pourquoi est-il souhaitable de continuer viser fin 2007 pour la conclusion des ngociations APE UE-Afrique de l'Ouest?  Addis Ababa Ministerial Declaration on Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations; Conference of Ministers of Trade of the African Union, 15-16 January 2007.  R. Grynberg and A. Clarke (2006) The European Development Fund and Economic  See Goodison, P.: Finding the Landing Ground in ACP-EU EPA Negotiations (Draft) January 2007     PAGE  PAGE 1 The EU market is an important destination for Kenyas exports which accounts for 30% of the countrys total exports. With the end of Lome IV Convention and emergence of Cotonou Agreement, the country will initiate measures to establish alternative trading arrangement with EU. Special attention will be given to the expansion and diversification of export products; and improved packaging, styling, branding and product designs. The country will aim at improving the production process through transfer of appropriate technology. Similarly quality and standards of Kenya productivity will be enhanced. - Source: Government of Kenya. 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$7$8$H$a$gdu7gdE????@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ $7$8$H$a$gdu7@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ AAA[AeAyAAAAAC;߰~ulaYaYaYaYaYaJhjhjCJaJmH sH hjCJaJhjhjCJaJhj5CJaJh!{5CJaJh 5CJaJhAuhu7PJhu7 hu7hu7CJOJQJ^JaJjhu7hu7Uhu7CJOJQJ^JaJh5CJOJQJ^JaJ#hu7h5CJOJQJ^JaJhCJOJQJ^JaJ#hh5CJOJQJ^JaJ@@@@@AACCFF"F#FFFFFGGGTHIDI$1$`a$gd=gd=$a$gdliN & Fgd(gdjh^hgd!{gdEgdu7CCC-D;DsEFF"F;FFFFFFFFFGIGJGMGgGiGGGGGGGGGĸĬĕĊsh]Sjhn80JUh'rh RCJaJh'rhjCJaJh'rhCi%6CJaJh'rh8@CJaJh'rhCi%CJaJh'rhfjCJaJh'rhfj6CJaJh'rh6CJaJh'rh5CJaJh'rhCJaJhjhmFCJaJhjhjCJaJhjhjCJaJmH sH hjCJaJmH sH GH&HTHUHIIIDIEInIoIII&J'JbJcJJJKKKKKK0L8L:L;LZL[L\L*M+M,M-MMMMMNNN}N~NNNNNNNNNjhgwUhgwh`!hn80J h^Gdhn8hDhn80JOJQJhQZhn86hn8CJOJQJ^JaJ'jhn80JCJOJQJU^JaJ hn86jhn80JUhfjhn86hn85DInII&JbJJKKK:LZL+MMN}N~NNNNNNNNNN &`#$gd;2gd^Ogd;gd@8]gdHNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNKQ')JL|}~̽Ԓԇsjshf@C5CJ4aJ4hGhn85CJ4aJ4j[\hn8UjzzC hn8UVjhn8Uh phn856h phn856CJH*h phn856CJhn8mH sH  hn85CJ hn8CJUhn8hgwh-z0JmHnHuh;2hW7I hW7I0JjhW7I0JU'NNNNNNNPQJQKQ |}~gd$a$gd pgd pgd pgd g_$a$gd g_ &`#$gd;2h]hgdW7IThe EU admits that tariffs are not important at all to them either as a revenue or protection tool. For most ESA countries, tariffs are important. Trade liberalization in this context, when narrowly defined as the dismantling of tariffs alone, however gradual, cannot lead ESA countries towards development and fufill the objectives of the Cotonou agreement. To the contrary ESA countries will be worse off either because of preference erosion, as the EU will continue to engage in multiple trade agreements with other and more advanced countries and regions of the world, and or through the loss of domestic revenue and competitiveness. Either way, the outcome is a disaster. And this type of trade liberalization between unequal partners has historically proven to be ineffective development tool and even counterproductive. Such a policy of trade liberalization could inhibit our countries ability to reduce poverty and ensure sustainable development. If EPA is to deliver on development, additional resources are needed. The commitments and obligations for most countries here will also require serious adjustments. It should be clear that additional commitments due to EPAs will require loss and diversion of resources on our part that could have been spent on health, education and infrastructure. We must not accept an EPA that does not address our development concerns, aspirations and goals and to this effect, we must send a clear and unambiguous message reflecting our priorities. 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